View the h-war Discussion Logs by month
View the Prior Message in h-war's April 2008 logs by: [date] [author] [thread] View the Next Message in h-war's April 2008 logs by: [date] [author] [thread] Visit the h-war home page.
To: H-WAR@H-NET.MSU.EDU Subject: Reply on Trachtenberg Review: Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 1963 ------------------ In reading Prof. Trachentenberg's Review of the article concerned with 1963 and the test Ban treaty, have reached a different conclusion...........one in keeping with not only this important topic but also, with conclusions reached during that decade while doing student research on this very same topic; only, for the focus of Soviet Foreign Policy. It is not possible to wholly accept Prof. Trachentberg's conclusions that the Test Ban Treaty was primarily in response to European concerns by the Soviets and Khrushchev. Due to these differences in interpretation and conclusions, have included here, some excepts from My original research in 1964, upon the sources and origins to Soviet and American agreement, resulting in the Test Ban Treaty: "Strategy and Tactics of the Nuclear Test Ban" [an original research paper] "President Kennedy said in a speech, July 26, 1962, 'this Treaty is not the millennium'. It will not resolve all conflicts or cause the Communists to forego their ambitions or eliminate the dangers of war. It will not reduce our need for arms or allies or programs of assistance to others. But it is an important first step....a step towards peace......a step towards reason, a step away from war.'[1] .......the Treaty was designed specifically to inhibit the arms race........and as such represented Arms Control rather than Disarmament. Even so, it required five years negotiations to arrive at this limited point, the first such after 19 years of Soviet American disarmament talks. Yet, as such, its real importance lay in what Pres. Kennedy suggested; a symbolization of a step towards peace and away from war. Further understanding of this symbol requires a look at the political environment surrounding the Treaty. My paper went on from there to indicate several factors; the first of these being the Cuban Missile Crises of 1962, whereby both Kennedy and Khruschev had to consider for the time 'the operational' characteristics to a nuclear war. Second, the Treaty stabilized and relaxed tensions then existing between the West and the Soviets, there by giving both sides opportunity and time to consider other possible avenues for cooperation and development of their interests....couple with recognition that nuclear war was no long 'viable' as an instrument of national policy. This latter dimension continues to be a major hallmark of considerations in the realm of nuclear weapons and policy, both nationally and internationally right to this present time of history, not only for the US and Russia but for other nations as well. Europe alone was not the consideration in reaching this agreement. In fact, the signing served to signal DeGualle, that US nuclear weapons would not necessarily be used for defense of Europe and spurred or strengthened his own case for France developing its independent nuclear capability....the 'force de frappe' and his going it along policy beyond NATO in Europe. For the Soviets, Khrushchev indicated its importance as signaling a change in the nuclear balance, making Soviet economic accomplishments and assistance more achievable, given a 'peaceful path possible', while the dangers of nuclear was make it 'preferrable'[6]. Chinese Communist protests against the Treaty only served to highlight both those developments of the Sino-Soviet split in the Communist world but also the impact of casting the Chinese as less 'peace loving' and more 'war-like' and committed to aggression at large. Internal domestic policy, the need to develop heavy industry and higher standards of living, while stressing 'economic competition' in foreign policy to capture support in the underdeveloped or 'developing nations of the 3rd world, then seen as the arena for competition with Western economic and political power; these, all served as strong stimuli in bringing about Soviet policy which saw the Treaty as in Communist interests during the 1960s and beyond.[a] Finally, the issues of personal standing for Khrushchev in the history of the Communist world and appeals to those uncommitted countries, who thru the UN had already indicated their own opposition to 'atmospheric testing' of nuclear weapons, held out dimensions to opportunity and prestige which could not be achieved thru reliance upon nuclear war and weapons, as the way for Communist interests to be advanced.[b] Appealing to world opinion and those areas of the 3rd world attempting to end 'colonialism' and establish their own freedom remained a priority for Communist world advancement, without which the long sought goals of overthrowing Capitalism and the West, could not take place. Thus, time to prove the superiority of Marxism, as an economic system, could only benefit from a drawn out military stalemate, politically. These conclusions served to boost the benefits seen as flowing from a Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Wyatt Reader UCLA__Whittier College Calif. Community Colleges//private Notes: from original student paper of 1964 1]Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. XLIX, No. 1259, Aug. 12, 1963, p.235. 6]P.E. Mosely, The Chinese-Soviet Rift: Origins and Portents", Foreign Affairs Quarterly, Oct. 1963' Vol. 42, No.1, p.23 a]There are several sources for these conclusions which are here summary listed only from the original paper. For the differences with the Chinese also see, June 14, 1963 letter: A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement: Letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in Reply to the Letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, March 30, 1963[Foreign Language Press, Peking, 1963]. The Chinese challenge to Soviet leadership in the Communist world served to give Khrushchev additional reason in signing the Treaty to indicate China's need to accept Soviet leadership and follow the Party line set in Moscow[see Mosely article]. On the Economic features related to Central Europe, the success of the Common Market and potential in the East European countries also served as stimulus to pursuit of the economic opportunities arising from reductions in nuclear tensions and political relations. b]The History of the General Assembly and its resolutions against nuclear testing needs be considered in the effects upon world opinion. Sec. Gen. U Thant was one witness at the signing of the Treaty and this served to highlight the interest beyond the Soviet-American duopoly in the nuclear field, of the world community. Appeal to the former colonial areas, stressing Marxist economic system superiority over Capitalism was then one source for gaining influence in these parts of the world in attempting to split 3rd world countries off from any potential alignment with the West, politically and militarily. The emphasis given to military interpretation of the Test falls short and can only be more greatly understood in terms of the political arena and dimensions to then existing competition between Western and Soviet policies and ideologies. ----- For subscription help, go to: http://www.h-net.org/lists/help/ To change your subscription settings, go to http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/wa?SUBED1=h-war ----- ----- For subscription help, go to: http://www.h-net.org/lists/help/ To change your subscription settings, go to http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/wa?SUBED1=h-war -----
|