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A couple of points on the the exchange surrounding Robert Buzzanco's use -- or, allegedly, abuse -- of the 1948 Kennan FRUS citation in which Kennan is quoted as recommending that the US "devise a pattern of relationships" which would seek to preserve, to the extent possible, the historically unprecedented disparity that existed at the time between the economic resources and capabilities of the US, and those of the rest of the world. I really cannot see how Kennan's words -- whether in Buzzanco's abridged quote or in the full passage submitted by Serewicz -- can be read as anything other than a strong endorsement of a US foreign policy committed to the maintenance, to the extent and for the duration possible, of US hegemony. I am also unclear why this should be considered a controversial interpretation of Kennan's views at the time. The confusion seems to arise from Mr. Serewicz' misunderstanding of the term 'hegemony', and in particular its relation to both the conventional term 'empire', and to what Kennan probably meant in the quoted passage by 'disparity'. Serewicz interprets Kennan as: >not suggesting a position of hegemony or empire, but security and goes on to assert that: >The word disparity [used by Kennan] simply means that the United States >has to be stronger than anyone who might threaten it or its interests. The confusion arises from Mr. Serewicz' apparent misunderstanding of the word 'hegemony'. The term 'hegemony' simply means a *preponderance of power* held by one state over the other states within certain international systems. It describes a specific, historically rare, objective distribution of relative power capabilities. A country with such a preponderance of power -- like the US after WWII or Britain in the 19th Century -- is called a 'hegemon'. A hegemon potentially holds the power to establish a "hegemonic order" to set the rules of international economic transactions and political relations if it chooses to do so -- again, as Britain did in the 19th Century and as the US did after WWII. Perhaps more important, it can prevent any other power, or coalition of powers, from doing so. (My fellow theorists of international relations have produced an enormous literature on the topic, which seems to be more familiar to some historians of the period than to others. The links between this literature and the historiography of the Cold War have been reviewed in *Diplomatic History* and elsewhere). The important point is that 'hegemony' is not a synonym for 'empire', or any other institutionalized order for exercising that preponderance of power, as Mr. Serewicz seems to use it. Indeed it is almost exactly what Kennan probably meant by 'disparity' in the passage under dispute. Moreover, I don't see how Kennan's statements in the fuller quote, such as those counseling Americans to "dispense with all sentimentality and daydreaming" with respect to the demands of the moment can be understood other than as underscoring Buzzanco's reading. It seems to me very important that contributors to H-DIPLO try to honor some sort of professionally respectful but intellectually realistic balance between phony denials that scholars' ideological and political inclinations have nothing to do with their scholarship, on the one hand, and partisan polemics conducted in the guise of textual interrogation, on the other. Larry George