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Ian Kershaw addressed the issue of Germany war with the U.S. in the second volume of his biography of Hitler (Nemesis: 1936-1945, NY: Norton, 2000). In April 1941 (after the Japanese-Soviet neutrality treaty), Ciano, the Italian foreign minister, stated in his diary: "Hitler still considers the Japanese card as extremely important in order, in the first place, to threaten and eventually counterbalance completely any American action." (p. 364, quoting Ciano Diaries entry for April 20, 1941) When Matsuoka, the Japanese foreign minister, came to Berlin in early April 1941, Hitler stated (in Kershaw's words, with internal quotations from source documentation): "[Hitler} then made an unsolicited offer. Should Japan 'get into' conflict with the United States, Germany would immediately 'draw the consequences.' America would seek to pick off her enemies one by one. 'Therefore Germany would,' Hitler said, 'intervene immediately in case of a conflict Japan-America, for the strength of the three Pact powers was their common action. Their weakness would be in letting themselves be defeated singly.'" (p. 364) After getting the news of Pearl Harbor, "Hitler thought he had good reason to be delighted. 'We can't lose the war at all,' he exclaimed. 'We now have an ally which has never been conquered in 3,000 years.'" (p. 442) "That Germany would declare war on the USA was, as we have seen, a matter of course. No agreement with the Japanese compelled it. But Hitler did not hesitate." (p. 445) Alan Jones MIT Security Studies Program
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