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John Kuehn's comment, "Certainly there was an air of "limited liability" in how FDR and others in and out of the government viewed U.S. participation in the war if it came to an active combat role" reminded me of a passage from Edward M. Coffman's, _The War to End All Wars_. Regarding America's entry into WWI, Coffman noted that there was a broad expectation that America would "extend credits" and "provide material" but a true understanding of American involvement, even after the declaration of war, was missing. "A few days after Congress endorsed Wilson's appeal, the chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, Thomas S. Martin, had stated flatly, 'Congress will not permit American soldiers to be sent to Europe.'" Recent reading about the early days of the Korean War repeat the theme. I begin to wonder whether chronic underestimation of the total investment required is not a necessary part of American war-making. Larry A. Grant naval historian, j.g.
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