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Having replied to the questions that Professor Miscamble put to me in response to my observations in the roundtable devoted to his new book, _From Roosevelt to Truman_. I turn now to Professor Trachtenberg’s comments on my review. My distinguished colleague begins by observing that in his _A Constructed Peace_ he advanced thesis that in 1945 Secretary of State James F. Byrnes accepted “a more or less friendly division of Europe into spheres of influence,” averring that I have erred in taking Professor Miscamble to task for accepting that thesis– to wit, that Byrnes sought a “spheres of influence peace.” Readers unfamiliar with the historiography of the Cold war would likely conclude that the idea of American support for a spheres-of-influence settlement in the first instance originated with Professor Trachtenberg’s; they could scarcely avoid the impression that I opposed that such interpretation. The idea that the United States was willing to accept the division of Europe into spheres of influence is in fact quite old, predating _A Constructed Peace_ by nearly half a century. The charge of the extreme Right that President Roosevelt sold out Eastern Europe at Yalta implied as much, and the paleo-revisionist writings of Denna Frank Fleming developed the ideas c. 1950 that Roosevelt had been amenable to a Soviet sphere in Eastern Europe and that the reversal of that stance by the Truman Administration did much to spark the Cold War. This conception of what Warren Kimball has called a “naked reverse right” was central to most later revisionist historiography, so much so that Professor Miscamble wrote his book largely to refute it. While the idea of Roosevelt’s support for a spheres-of-influence settlement is venerable, I was the first scholar to propose way back in 1979 and 1981 that the Truman Administration was also initially willing to countenance a Soviet sphere, and that in 1946 Secretary of States James F. Byrnes even tried to formalize a postwar settlement on that basis in. Since Professor Trachtenberg has at various times cited the article in _The Journal of American History_ in which I developed that thesis most completely, I am, to say the least, astonished that a contrary position should be ascribed to me. Nonetheless, the interpretation of American policy that I developed in 1981, and which I hold still, differs from that of Professors Trachtenberg and Miscamble in a most basic respect: their position, if I have not missed any understated qualifications, is that the United States simply abandoned any concern for Eastern Europe without thought for the consequences of that action for the international system, the welfare of the peoples of the region, the influence politically well-connected kin in the United States, or the obligations that the United States had assumed under armistices agreements and treaties of peace, and sundry other instruments. Eastern Europe, in their telling, was flung at Stalin’s feet, to be his in fee simple. My position was – and is – that while Washington accepted Soviet predominance in East Central Europe and the Balkans, there were limits to that acceptance. Against the conventional wisdom of the day, I wrote in 1981 that “American opposition to spheres was conditional rather than categorical. From the time that it was apparent that the USSR would survive Adolph Hitler’s onslaught, policy-makers anticipated Soviet predominance east of the Elbe. Their world view, a Wilsonianism deeply colored by great-power chauvinism, disposed them to accept it; untouched by illusions of omnipotence, they knew that uncompromising resistance would in any case be futile. American efforts in Europe, consequently, represented neither a utopian scheme to rid the continent of spheres of influence nor a Faustian bid to dominate it, but a search for stable spheres of a kind consonant with the interests of the principal victors of World War II.”  As John L. Harper aptly notes in his post in this thread, “Truman and Byrnes tried to slow down and limit the consolidation of Soviet power” in Easter Europe. But they did not try to eliminate it. Professor Trachtenberg asked why Truman and Byrnes should have feared “that the division of Europe as a whole between east and west might well lead to war” The reasons for that concern and for the consequent attempt to keep Soviet predominance within certain limits varied over time and from player to player, but those that obtained during Byrnes’ tenure will be familiar to those versed in the diplomacy and geopolitical thinking of the day. From 1943 on there was general concern at the rivalry for influence in Europe that was developing between Britain and the Soviet Union. The Soviet treaty of mutual assistance with Czechoslovakia was one prominent marker; others were a much-publicized speech by Jan Christian Smuts called for a British security sphere in Western Europe, a call taken up and repeated at full volume by the _London Times_ The next year American diplomats learned that the British Chiefs of Staff were planning how best to mobilize German strength for use against Russia in a future war and working on plans for that war. The Foreign Office, thoroughly alarmed, put a stop to the Chiefs’ projects but not before the Soviets had learned of them, as they learned of almost everything of consequence that happened in Washington and London. (Smuts’ idea lived on to become first the Treaty of Dunkirk and then the Brussels Pact.) As the State Department conceptualized these developments, there had developed an Anglo-Soviet “power politics scramble for position.” The presidential briefing books for both Yalta and Potsdam included a letter from the Joint Chiefs of Staff underlining how potentially ominous the scramble was for the United States: in brief, it might lead to an Anglo-Soviet war, which would lead to England’s defeat, even in alliance with the United States. That result would leave the USSR in possession of most or all of the continent.  By the end of World War II no proposition commanded more support in the United States that the domination of Europe (Eurasia) by a single power would be a disaster of unimaginable proportions, tantamount to defeat in the war, whatever the fate of the Axis.  The contention of Professor Trachtenberg and Miscamble that Byrnes categorically turned Eastern Europe and the Balkans over to the USSR at Potsdam without a further care for the place rests upon Byrnes handling of reparations in Germany – an issue separate from Eastern Europe – and a few anecdotes. What finds no place in their narratives – none at all – is the actual course of American diplomacy in Eastern Europe after Potsdam. There is no mention of Byrnes’s proposed treaty of disarmament, the peace treaties with the former German satellites, or the constant encouragement of the opposition parties in the Soviet sphere, which continued down to their suppression. The essence of these initiatives was this: to keep the spirit of resistance to Soviet *domination* alive while pursuing expeditiously treaties of peace that would secure the withdrawal of Soviet forces. Meanwhile, the Soviets were to be reassured by measures to guarantee their security and to preserve their *influence* in Eastern Europe. These included the guaranteed disarmament of Germany, acceptance of the Soviets’ treaties of mutual assistance with their neighbors, and the far-reaching guarantees included in the peace treaties for the former German satellites which, inter alia, limited the size of their armies, limited the permissible range of political activity in the these countries by banning fascist parties and all propaganda hostile to the Allies and giving to the USSR the right of intervention to enforce these terms. None of this is mysterious. Before Byrnes began his epic efforts in 1946 his chief adviser, Charles E. Bohlen, outlined the problem: the chief concern that the United States had in relation to the USSR was “Soviet expansion into Eastern Europe,” which appeared to aim “complete Soviet domination and control over all phases of the external and internal life of those countries.” In time this could only lead to “increasing friction with the western democracies and the eventual division as a last resort of the world into sphere of influence in the most undesirable and dangerous sense” and “the formation of the world into an armed camp in preparation for the next war.” On the other hand, the Soviets were entitled to “the legitimate prerogatives of a great power in regard to small countries resulting from geographic proximity,” which included a veto over the actions of the smaller states in the “politico-strategic aspect of their foreign relations.” This, Bohlen urged, should be made clear to the Soviets.  The use of the peace treaties to create a stable situation in Eastern Europe through the creation of an open Soviet sphere of influence was discussed and approved by the State-War-Navy-Coordinating Committee on which Byrnes sat. Byrnes later explained his purposes to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.  We can argue about how realistic Byrnes’s policy was, whether it could have achieved a stable European settlement if it had been realized in its entirely, or whether it provided a sufficient guarantee of Soviets interests. But what we are not free to do construe the efforts of Byrnes and other American diplomats during the conferences of 1946 as a sort of masquerade to hide their indifference to the fate of Eastern Europe and the European balance of power. Why, then, did Byrnes threaten to resign when in September 1946 when Henry Wallace delivered a speech calling for just the policy that Professor’s Miscamble and Trachtenberg now attribute to him? Why, after Byrnes efforts to moderate Soviet influence had failed, did the United States hope to draw Eastern Europe from the Soviet orbit with what Bohlen in July 1947 called the “magnetism” of the Marshall Plan? And why, when that effort had failed, did the United risk World War III by trying to “roll back” the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe through various forms of direct action in the region? And how in the world can we explain what policymakers among themselves about the policies they had carried through? As I read the evidence, Bohlen was the intellectual architect of Byrnes’s policy, though it surely appealed to the Secretary’s well-known penchant for compromise. And this is what Bohlen had to say in the classified speech of mentioned just above: Contemporary charges that the United States was “attempting to deny to Russia . . . special interests, based on geography, in Eastern Europe” were simply not true. After reviewing Byrnes’ efforts of 1946, he said, “All the arrangements that the United States has reached, and many they have sought with the Soviet Government, have indicated perfectly clearly we were not attempting to deny to Russia the prerequisites of a great power, namely that she has a certain primary strategic interest in the countries that lie along her borders. It has been the abuse of that right which has caused most of the trouble we have had.”  Perhaps Professors Miscamble and Trachtenberg know something that Bohlen did not. Eduard Mark  “Charles E. Bohlen and the Acceptable Limits of Soviet Hegemony In Eastern Europe: A Memorandum of 18 October 1945,” Diplomatic History, 3 (Spring 1979), 201-213; “American Policy Toward Eastern Europe and the Origins of the Cold War: An Alternative Interpretation,” _Journal of American History_, 68 (September 1981), 313-36.  Ibid., 314,  For State’s warning and its context, see ibid., 232-26. For the JCS’s views, see Attachment to “American Policy Towards Spheres of Influence,” FRUS: 1945: The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 106-108; Attachment to “British Plan for a Western European Bloc,” FRUS, 1945: Conference of Berlin, 1: 264-266. [5) Memorandum by Charles E. Bohlen, 18 October 1945, in Mark, “Charles E. Bohlen and the Acceptable Limits of Soviet Hegemony In Eastern Europe.” Byrnes’s speech to the Herald Tribute Forum on 31 October 1945, among other statements of his at the time, appears to reflect Bohlen’s counsel. Ibid. Significantly, the State Department’s USSR Committee described Byrne’s speech of 31 October 1945 as a definitive statement of American policy. Minutes of the U.S.S.R. Committee, 26 June 1946, NARA, RG 59, Records of the Interdepartmental and Intradepartmental Committees of the Department of State, Box 16. For the tremendous importance that Byrnes attached to the treaty of demilitarization for Germany, see Oral History Interview with James W. Riddlesberger, April 1972, Harry S. Truman Library.  State-Navy-War Coordinating Committee, SWNCC 244, 5 January 1946, subj: “Treaties of Peace with Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary,” NARA, RG 165, ABC Files, Box 248, 336 Rumania (26 September 1943), Section 1-B; JCS Memorandum 1595/1, Joint Secretariat to distribution, 25 January 1946, subj: “Military, Naval and Air Clauses of the Treaties of Peace with Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary,” ibid.; State-Navy-War Coordinating Committee, SWNCC 244, 12 February 1946 (as revised 5 March 1946), subj: “Treaties of Peace with Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary,” ibid.; US Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, _Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Eightieth Congress, First Session, Treaties of Peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary_ (Washington, 1947), 28-29.  Charles E. Bohlen, “U. S. Relations with the Curtain States,” 10 July 1947, NARA, RG 59, Records of Charles E. Bohlen, box 6.