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H-NET BOOK REVIEW Published by H-War@h-net.msu.edu (August, 2000) Richard Harding. _Seapower and Naval Warfare, 1650-1830_. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1999. xx + 356 pp. Maps, tables, notes, appendix, bibliography, and index. $45.00 (cloth), ISBN 1-55750-888-7. Reviewed for H-War by Ricardo A. Herrera <rherrera@txlutheran.edu>, Texas Lutheran University Richard Harding's _Seapower and Naval Warfare_ is a synthesis of classic and recent works of naval history during the age of sail. In this slim volume the author examines the nature and "overall exercise of seapower" and the process by which battleships in the age of sail became the "ultimate expression of a global force" (p. xix). While maritime commerce and warfare were commonplace by the middle of the seventeenth century, according to Harding, it was not until the period between 1650 and 1830 that they had become indispensable elements in international affairs, national development, and indeed exercised a determinative role in world history. The author approaches the exercise of seapower from a global perspective, but necessarily concentrates on Western Europe in general and England in particular. He concludes that for Britain, or indeed for any nation aspiring to global power, "seapower lay not just in the navy or battlefleet, but in the effective integration of her administration, political system, army, colonies and maritime economy" directed toward achieving the nation's greater goals (p. 286). For Harding, the processes by which seapower was established, exercised, and maintained are key. Throughout he agrees with many of Alfred Thayer Mahan's judgments regarding the course of naval history in the age of sail, but with an important distinction. Battleship supremacy was not inevitable, and was not alone the full measure of seapower. The nation-states of the world had other options before them; it was through a combination of trial, error, ideology, and economics that Britain developed its overwhelming seapower. By focusing on the processes and not on the assumed inevitability of battleship supremacy, Harding has added an important measure of depth Mahan's work. In a short first chapter (eleven pages) Harding sketches in broad outline the writing and teaching of naval history, its influences, and significant developments since the late-nineteenth century. Brevity notwithstanding, this chapter is one of the most important because it lays out the broad outlines and thrust of naval historiography, gives context to this work, and suggests subjects in need of further research. This brevity also indicates that Harding wrote _Seapower and Naval Warfare_ with specialists in mind. He assumes his readers will approach this work with some prior knowledge of naval history, thus it is best suited for graduate readers and above. Early naval historians wrote against the backdrop of revolutionary technological change, "deep quasi-Darwinian assumption[s] that...nations were engaged in a deadly struggle for survival," and the belief that history, if studied scientifically, would reveal readily understandable, rational patterns (p. 2). These early histories, therefore, reflected the navalist search for the immutable, underlying principles governing the development and application of naval power; history in service to practical concerns. Preeminent among them was Mahan, whose _Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783_ (Boston: Little, Brown, 1890), underscored his belief in the inevitable rise of the modern battleship fleet and its indispensable connection with global power. Despite pre-1914 work on commerce raiding and amphibious operations, and disappointment over the seeming limited successes of the Allied navies in the First World War, Mahan's contentions still held great sway with many naval thinkers and historians. Mahan's influence was and is such that his work serves as a point of reference throughout this book. In subsequent chapters Harding takes the reader on a world tour outlining the state of naval affairs in Asia, Africa, Europe, and the Middle East and touching upon topics that merit further research. As the book progresses, Harding's European concentration becomes more pronounced, focusing on the struggle for maritime supremacy between England, France, the Netherlands, and Spain with the eventual establishment of British global (read maritime) hegemony between 1789 and 1830. Battle, tactics, strategy, and ship design played important roles in British seapower, but there was much more to it than that. Dockyard management, political leadership and vision, commercial influence, and forestry were but parts of what can rightly be termed the institutional or bureaucratic nature of seapower. _Seapower and Naval Warfare_ is a valuable contribution to our understanding seapower and a worthwhile synthesis for advanced students of naval history in the age of sail. Copyright (c) 2000 by H-Net, all rights reserved. This work may be copied for non-profit educational use if proper credit is given to the author and the list. For other permission, please contact H-Net@h-net.msu.edu.
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