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Prof. Brown does seem to have the understanding with this posting of the A-Bomb history and surrender terms offered to end WW II in the Pacific. The unconditional surrender doctrine and requirement was not dropped. It also seems the sources have something to do with who understood what. Using Sec. Byrnes as the source is not quite the same as using Truman and others as the source for terms acceptable to the US. Would further suggest this might be part of the answer why Craig and Radchenko are not quite willing to accept versions that are in common agreement elsewhere. While far from an expert in this subject matter, the few sources and research done, indicates a commonality to this term as the final US position. It is possible to a little further with this explanation but the reply posted already sets down most of those Prof. Brown has called to attention. Two final observations, it was suggested or the feeling of some, at the time of August 1945, had the US insisted upon removal of the Royals from Japan as rulers, ie, The Emperor, so fanatical would have been Japanese reply, that Army and Navy hardliners would indeed, have imposed upon the entire nation, then, a mass suicide form of hari-kiri, wherein, all the A-bombing the US could or would use, would not bring surrender, until Japan was completely destroyed. Also interesting, such a fate would have likely won the day for those who preferred blockading Japan and stand off firebombing, etc., until Japan was leveled from one end to the other. Nothing the US would have done, however, would have prevented Stalin from entering the war and sending 1 million Soviet troops forward in territory and lands under Japan's military or control. Finally, there should be recalled, an attempt was made by some of the hardliners in Japan to coup d' etat, the Emperor off the throne once his announced intent to surrender became known. {Hollywood even has made a movie about this bit of history]. The upshot was those who tried were stopped by the Emperor's palace loyals. How amusing, that the Military which stood by the Diety status of the Emperor would think they could replace Him, if he didn't rule or decide their way! So much for divinity among the competing wanna be rulers in Japan at that time.It only worked, so it seems, so long as they got their way and policies. Dieties ruling countries, only exist, by this history, so long as they are convenient to those who accept their decisions, even among those who proclaim it, inviolate right and belief. Their belief in their own system seems to have lasted only as long as it favored their own interests and policies. Wyatt Reader UCLA-Whittier College From: rhbrown <rhbrown@oregano.ocn.ne.jp> Date: Monday, January 11, 2010 9:12:01 AM Subject: CROSS-POSTED REVIEW H-Diplo Roundtable Vol. XI, No. 8 (2009)- Campbell Craig and Sergey Radchenko. The Atomic Bomb and the Origins of the Cold War With the editor's indulgence, I thought I might cross-post a comment I made on the review that was cross-posted from H-Diplo. [Review is here: http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/logbrowse.pl?trx=vx&list=H-War&month=1001&week= b&msg=UhaUuS39HhOtK0fqPGHFuQ&user=&pw= ] " Campbell Craig and Sergey Radchenko write: "... why did [the US] accept the Japanese demand that the emperor must stay when it had previously ruled that out, and when indeed it had been fighting for two and a half bloody years under the banner of unconditional surrender?" The note says "the authority of the emperor" will be subject to the Allied supreme commander and, in line with democratic ideology, that the ultimate form of Japan's government will be determined by "the freely expressed will of the Japanese people"; neither of these ideas fit well with the political ideology and preferences of Japan's leadership, which held that the emperor was the supreme commander and sovereign, and thus subject to no one, and that his authority derived not from the people but from the fact that he was the "manifest deity" representing the "one line [of rulers] unbroken since time immemorial" (bansei-ikkei). thus for him to reaffirm his "sacred decision" to accept the Potsdam Declaration. However, for the hardliners (Army Minister Anami Korechika, Army Chief of Staff Umezu Yoshijiro, and Navy Chief of Staff Toyoda Soemu), the fact that Byrnes' reply did not *clearly accept* Japan's condition was enough for them to argue that it did not guarantee the kokutai and thus should be rejected. (Students in my current seminar on the surrender are divided, with most agreeing with Anami's reading but sympathizing with Hirohito's). I might add that had Washington not taken this ambiguous route, the hardliners may very well have carried the day and the war would likely have continued, perhaps even into November and the bloodbath awaiting everyone in Kyushu (assuming the US didn't have a change of mind about going through with the invasion). (1) In this sense, the Byrnes note reminds one of the Potsdam Declaration in that it says "this is what is going to happen once you surrender." There are a few folks who view the Potsdam Declaration as offering a conditional surrender, too, but it strikes me as a classic ultimatum, i.e., surrender or else ("prompt and utter destruction"), with the terms being a one-sided statement of what surrender will and will not bring." Cheers, Roger Brown, Ph.D. Professor of History (Modern Japan & US-Japan Relations) Saitama University email: rhbrown@oregano.ocn.ne.jp rhbrown <rhbrown@oregano.ocn.ne.jp> To change your subscription settings, go to http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/wa?SUBED1=h-war Wyatt Reader <hirener@EARTHLINK.NET> ----- For subscription help, go to: http://www.h-net.org/lists/help/ To change your subscription settings, go to http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/wa?SUBED1=h-war -----
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