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It is always a pleasure and treat to read something here on ancient warfare and especially the Roman military. While I don't agree completely with Mr Jordan's analogy of the later Roman Army, I also don't agree with some of what Mr de Jong wrote either. He wrote: "First of all the number of 'barbarians' in the Roman army, per se, has always been significant, but remained a minority even in the late Empire. The Roman army also employed many 'allies' (foederati?), and the number of these may have increased strongly in the late Empire, but I'm not sure." My comments: Let's mention some references about the composition of the Roman Army. First to go to the last period first: We read in Thomas Burns' "Barbarians within the Gates of Rome" page 222 when he is discussing the situation in 400-408 and roles of Stilicho and Alaric and the Roman court's accusation that Stilicho was a traitor, "This was easy enough since barbarian recruits filled its (the army's) ranks from top to bottom. As Roman soldiers, regulars or auxilliaries, barbarians were proving their loyalty at precisely the same time that Stilicho's detractors found in his barbarian origins a standard Roman explanation." (for defeat) Of course one has to read many pages of Burns to get the whole picture. Then we find in Pat Southern and Karen Dixon - "The Late Roman Army" the chapter IV on Recruitment - A lengthy discussion of all aspects. They describe the results of Diocletian's introduction of conscription and its impact on the landowners who had to produce recruits. (Somthing like Russian landowners having to produce serfs for the Tsar's army) On page 67 they write, "From the fourth century onwards, the Roman army suffered from a lack of recruits. The devastation of frontier zones, particularly along the Danube and the Rhine, during the third century, resulting in the reduced ability of these regions to supply recruits, has been held as a primary reason for the manpower shortage which affected the Empire during the late period. Depopulation from plague is also felt to have contributed to the problem. As Liebeschuetz stated, however, these factors can only form part of the answer. There is abundant evidence to show that military service had become unpopular amongst the citizens." They continue at too much length to quote here but note widespread self-mutilation to avoid military service. But one sentence is appropros "What caused such apathy towards military service amongst the citizens, particularly when the Empire was so seriously threatened?" Further, "This apathetic approach by the citizen population towards enlistement resulted in the government having to look elsewhere for recruits, namely amongst the barbarians." They discuss at length. But at this time the conscription itself did not include a large part of the urban population because it was considered unfit for military service. We find the situation described in similar terms by Arther Ferrill in "The Fall of the Roman Empire: The Military explanation." Phil Barker in "The Armies and Enemies of Imperial Rome" provides detailed illustrations of the many 'barbarian' troop types in the Roman army covering the period 150 BC to 600 AD. He writes on page 16 "From the late 1st century AD onwards, the Romans made minor use of parties of barbarian warriors who fought in their own native dress under either tribal leaders or attached Roman officers. They served for a term of years, but unlike regular Auxilia, did not receive the citizenship on discharge. From the 4th century on, the practice grew and whole tribes were allowed to immigrate into the empire on condition that they undertook to serve as Foederati." And more on the topic as well. Michael Grant writing in "The Army of the Caesars " page 284 comments, "The greatest problem of the day was the influx of these vast quantities of 'barbarians' into the provinces. The historian, good military writer though he is, (Ammianus) fails to recognize that these men fulfilled a real need; since the Roman army, unless it could be enabled to enrole them as recruits, would no longer continue to exist at all." Writing about Julian's great victory over 30,000 Alamanni at Argentorate he comments, "It was a victory worthy of the greatest days of Rome, displaying amply that there was nothing degenerate or disloyal about the massive Germanized Roman armies of these later imperial times." On page 277 he discusses Diocletian's conscription measures. "It was recruited by systematic annual conscription among Roman citizens. But extensive use was also made of the warlike tastes and various specialist skills of barbarian tribesmen. These included numerous Germans as well as men from the highlands of Asia Minor." Further, "Like Diocletian he (Constantine) greatly expanded the German element, since he keenly appreciated the particular qualifications of the Germans for fighting against their hostile compatriots on the other side of the frontier." Of course there is much much more on this theme in this book. But the more fundamental problem lies in the question of who were Roman "citizens' in the first place. Grant notes on page 263 that Caracalla greatly expanded the citizenship rolls to almost the entire free population of the empire, "whatever their racial origins". "This meant that the principal, traditional difference between citizen legionaries and non-citizen auxiliary troops - a difference which had long been more or less nominal - had now lost whatever small meaning it still retained. The elimination of this distinction, like the measure as a whole, provided a useful, egalitarian uniformity. But it also made it harder to attract ambitious men into the legions. So the need for conscription, far from diminishing, tended to increase." Now here we have something that might be worth considering as an analogy to today. Is the rapidly increasing problem of retention of the most qualified officers and men and recruitment of the most ambitious young men being impacted by the increasing perception among them that they are serving with increasing numbers of lesser mortals who are even being given preference for advancement? Just a thought. But to return to Rome and the question of the composition of the Roman Army. We quickly find that 'citizen' can mean something quite different from what might popularly be called "Roman." And we find that the composition of the army had long before the 3rd century and Caracalla ceased to be Italian. H. M D. Parker in "Roman Legions" has a chapter on "The recruiting areas of the legions" . He notes that as early as Augustus 'levies were raised from the vernacula multitudo or non-citizen population of Rome to fill up gaps in the army of the Rhine." Here we are speaking of people resident then in Italy and even in Rome, but not racially Roman or even Italic. Page 170 he writes: in order to secure soldiers for the legions, the citizenship was given to individuals. (In contrast to people being first citizens of some specific town that was then given enmass the Roman citizenship). He continues, "The recruit could therefore honestly describe himself as a Roman citizen, and on his discharge might enjoy the privileges of Roman town life." He notes that very early on local recruiting resulted in the eastern armies being filled with Greek speakers in contrast to the Latin speakers of the west. "Consequently the example set by Pompey and Antony (eastern recruitment) was followed by Augustus and his successors, and the principle of a Roman citizen army was maintained by this fiction." He notes that the reorganization of the Roman army that created the frontier units who lived in garrisons along the empire's borders or at least in the border marches resulted in these troops marrying local women - and this well before such marriage was legalized in 197 - and since their sons went into the army declaring 'castris' as their place of birth, they were already only half "Roman" even if their father's had come from Italy. Of course the fact that the emperors ( generals) were themselves provincials ought to be well known. The other cited authors also mention the results of marriage of soldiers on frontier duty. Parker writes that AD 43 already is a date showing a significant shift in the membership of the legions. Here are some statistics he presents. "Up to 42 AD the proportion of Italians was about 50%, and between 42 and 58 or 60 AD it rose to about 70%. This is accounted for by the decrease at that period in recruits from the Asiatic provinces. But for 70 - 117 the decline in the proportion of Italians was gradual again. He gives details from inscriptions legion by legion. He notes that Tacitus attested to the policy of recruiting again the Easrtern legions from Galatia and Cappadocia for Corbulo's campaign. He gives information showing that of 61 soldiers in the first century 8 are from Italy Gaul or Africa (note that Africa was later a critical recruiting ground) 53 from Asia Minor, Syria and Egypt and of this 53 29 from Galatia and 24 from Syria and Egypt. Many give 'castris' as their birthplace. Of course the 'Egyptians' were recruited only from the Greco-Macedonian population, not from Egyptian farm peasantry. There are more detailed statistics on the location of origin of Roman soldiers throughout the 1st century on. One interesting comment is the observation made by contemporaries when whole units of the Roman army in Italy turned to the east at sunrise to welcome the sun because they were Syrian sun-worshipers. G. Watson, in "The Roman Soldier", describes the "probatio' and mentions also conscription and the increasing unpopularity of service. He mentions self-multilation to avoid service - Southern also mentions this. Graham Webster, "The Roman Imperial Army' has a chapter on "The composition of the Army'. He writes starting on page 107. 'it is clear from a study of the origines of legionaries given on their tombstones that the recruitment areas gradually spread outwards towards the frontiers in the first two centuries of the Empire. Italy fell from the position of supplying 65$ of the recruits in the period from Augustus to Caligula down to less than 1 % in the second century". He provides a table that shows that by the reign of Hadrian Africa was by far the main recruiting locale with Pannonia and Moesia in second place. And this is only for the Western legions. We might back track even further and discuss the change in the composition of the Roman army during the 2nd Punic War when Scipio took citizen farmers to Spain and kept them there for years. And the survivors of Cannae were exiled to duty in Sicily for the duration. Mr De Jong continues: "The further problem is that it is difficult to say that the fall of the Roman Empire was caused by military weakness. Even in the late Empire, Roman armies suffered few defeats against non-Romans (the Sassanid Empire was certainly not barbarian and Rome's most dangerous foe). Quite probably the late Roman army was still a very efficient military force, maybe even as good as it was in the 2nd century. Problems facing the Empire were epidemics, economic stagnation and depression and internal instability (Roman fought Romans a lot). IMHO defense of the imperial border suffered from these stresses and not from unwillingness to fight." My comments: I agree with the first part of this as some of the quotations I gave indicate. The later Roman army, even though by then not composed of what the popular mind might think of as 'Romans' was indeed a very effective fighting force. Epidemics, economic stagnation and depression _actually accute inflation too, caused stresses. And the Germans and others in the army were quite willing to fight. But the masses in the Italian cities were not so willing. Nor were the upperclasses, who by then were escaping the urban centers, abandoning even their role as senators, and retiring to their latifundia. And this late Roman army in the west spent a lot of its time fighting itself as one general vied with the other for the Imperial purple. Meanwhile the eastern emperor bribed the Huns to leave Constantinople alone and seek further fortune in the west. So the original comments actually mix two different issues - the composition of the Roman army and the capability of the Roman army to fight. But we need to throw in another question. For what was this fine Roman army fighting? Sorry, I hope this has not dragged on too long. There are many related issues that might be discussed as well. For instance the nature of the Roman 'empire' itself from start to end and function played in it by the army. best wishes john sloan
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