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Some good, thought-provoking arguments and opinions on this issue (one of the reasons I enjoy this list). [Paul Robinson writes:] "The whole point of the Kosovo operation was to save civilian lives. Putting them at risk to save friendly troops made no sense as far as accomplishing the mission was concerned. Likewise it would make no sense to obliterate a country in order to save a few of your own men, if your aim is to make the country prosperous, stable and democratic." The flippant answer is that obliterating a country to make it prosperous, stable, and democratic seems to have worked with Japan. Of course, it was followed up by many years of fairly enlightened occupation by the MacArthur Shogunate. Obviously, there are many ways we could have done the Kosovo operation better. I would like to hear some suggestions from those on the list who regard it as wrong to provide what alternatives they would offer that had a good chance of producing more acceptable political conditions than the current ones AND were acceptable to NATO (not just the US--outside of the UK, I don't remember hearing a groundswell from the other 17 NATO nations to send in the ground troops). Inserting ground troops into Kosovo would not have ended the war faster (can't get there from here fast enough), would have produced more civilian casualties than the aerospace campaign, inflicted far more damage (to civilian as well as military targets), and possibly fractured the NATO alliance. "Sometimes to achieve the mission you have to lose some of your own men, but the problem nowadays is that 'force protection' is considered more important than the mission, and that has to be wrong." A valid criticism if force protection is taken too far. US military leaders have noted what happened to Brig Gen Schwalier (the USAF general commanding in Riyadh when a powerful bomb detonated outside the perimeter fence killed several of his people). He was pulled off the list for promotion to 2-star and quietly retired. The loss of two US aircraft over Yugoslavia was treated as a big news story, even though the aircrews were rescued. The enemy does get a vote in what happens in war, and sometimes they will be smart enough to get in some good shots--count on it. "Here again we come across a specifically American problem. Because the US armed forces have so much power they tend to use it. Smaller professional armies, eg. British and Canadian, lacking that power, have learnt to do things other ways, and found that in lots of circumstances they work rather better. So if somebody breaks a ceasefire, maybe it was a mistake, you can defuse the situation, handle it calmly and peacefully." Being a member of the US Air Force (the big US "asymmetric strategy", since nobody else can afford an air and space force like us right now), this gave me pause. It can't be denied that not having a hammer in one's tool kit may lead to creative ways to get a job done without it. At the same time, sometimes the hammer really comes in handy. The trick is (of course) recognizing when it is time to go to the hammer. I would argue that the UN/NATO experience in Bosnia from 92-94 suggests that there are also times where not using the hammer is a mistake. "But what America appears to be currently doing is substituting killing for real fighting, when we risk what we are willing to inflict. Over the long term, I believe that will cost us respect, perhaps in our own eyes, and almost certainly in the eyes of those whom we will have to fight. Sometimes you have to not only look like you're going to fight, you have to fight. This attitude does not have to and should not imply an acceptance of casualties for their own sake, but it does imply respect and understanding for the enemy's pride and for what drives people to fight." I have to admit that I have a great trouble distinguishing "substituting killing for real fighting" from "acceptance of casualties for their own sake." It makes me think of a group of Philistines complaining bitterly about what will happen to warrior values if a pipsqueak kid can off a huge armored solder by using a sling bullet. How exactly is using aerospace power, a long range artillery piece, or a longbow that outranges the enemy knights not "real fighting?" If it means "not fighting the way my enemy wants me to fight," let's plead guilty and move on. Mike Condray Lt Col, USAF
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