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I would like to opine on Geoffrey Magargee's thoughtful comments. As mentioned in my earlier post, I find the monolithic German General Staff (or even Generalitat) thesis hard to swallow and over-rated. I know the basic premise, that these gentlemen had similar schooling and experiences, were encouraged to think or react in similar ways, etc. (Potential critics please: don't fixate on my terms like "think"--I'm trying to be brief here!) I know that the entire Auftragstaktik, commander-chief of staff relationship and other aspects of Truppenfuhrung hinged on this training. With that in mind...these men never surrendered their individuality. There are many examples in both world wars to back me up. Just look at the many cases where one general replaced another and then reacted radically differently from his predecessor to essentially a similar situation. Whether replaced due to being KIA, being fired by national leadership (imperial or Nazi), etc. they often acted differently. Look at how two generals might react to being encircled or having a certain opportunity in front of them. Look at how different generals might solve the problem of invading France or feel about the Commissar Order. One general might resign or commit suicide rather than take a command from Hitler that the next guy takes with relish. Hitler used the divide-and-conquer tactic in all aspects of his life: SA vs. SS; NSDAP vs. army; navy vs. air force; this general vs. that general. The Generalitat fell for it hook, line and sinker and in many cases cashed in their honor and professionalism. Thank goodness Germany didn't have a George Marshall. Robert Kirchubel
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