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Hello all, As I see it, Erik Lund's line of argument contradicts everything I have read about the RAF in the inter-war and early WW2 period. I will therefore try and present counter-evidence to his points as presented below. First, Jill Russell's comment that "The evolution of the U.S. Air Force very much had to do with finding it a self-contained mission so as to validate its separate branch standing" is *exactly* applicable to the RAF in the immediate post-1918 period, and arguably ever since. The only caveat is that the RAF's self-contained mission *was* the effort to validate its survival as an independent entity, and that the RAF was willing to push its strategic bombing pretensions into the background in order to present the politicians with whatever they wanted to see. Consequently, it can be argued that the Smuts Report making the RAF responsible for metropolitan defence is a red herring for two reasons. First, because of the RAF's chameleon like ability to reinvent itself to suit the occasion, and more importantly because of the Ten Year Rule which came into vogue in the early 1920s. This was an assumption that it would be at least a decade before any serious threat could emerge against Britain, which lingered on into the mid 1930s, due to government fiscal reluctance rather than any real conviction. In any event, the fact that the RAF did not take its home defence role seriously is evident in the fact that by the early 1930s it was still equipped with aircraft barely different from those of 1918 - and remember that the aircraft and techniques of 1918 were ineffective against German night bombing raids. However, the most conclusive evidence is that provided by Trenchard, the early strategic bombing apostle, himself. According to Noble and Frankland's official history "The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany", Trenchard argued thus in 1923 for the preservation of bombing doctrine: "Fighter defence must...be kept to the smallest possible number. It was, in the view of the Chief of the Air Staff [Trenchard], in a sense only a concession to the weakness of the civilians, who would demand protection and cause the Cabinet and even the Secretary of State for Air to do likewise. These demands, he [Trenchard] insisted, must be resisted as far as possible." In addition, the irrelevance of the Smuts reccomendations is highlighted by the idea that all three services would or could be allowed to duplicate each others' functions, which is frankly laughable given the inter-service climate in the period - a theme to which I shall return shortly. I would also contend that the introduction of an independent RAF into the British defence equation complicated the "chronic problem" of divided responsibilities further, rather than solving it. Government parsimony meant that there was barely sufficient funding to cover existing home and imperial commitments, and the introduction of an additional high-tech (and therefore expensive) competitor for what was available may have suited the governments divide and rule tactics, but actually degraded military efficiency overall. I am unclear as to what the statement "RAF attempts to go back on this arrangement in the 1930s" refers to. The RAF controlled everything that flew, except for the Fleet Air Arm after it regained its independence. The only Army personnel who got to fly were officers seconded to the RAF, who were trained and employed by RAF Army Co-operation Command, in RAF Co-operation squadrons. The impression Lund gives that the Army and RN voluntarily gave up their air arms to help the RAF is a bit amusing to me. This assertion suggests an insufficient appreciation of the depth and viciousness of inter-service rivalry in the interwar period, or of the Machiavellian abilities of the RAF at playing the bureaucratic game. The latter far outstripped its older sibling services, and the RAF remains a master of the technique to date. In addition, I beg to differ that RAF administrative control in Iraq was not the same as air policing, or Air Control to use the proper term. Air Control was the sole justification for this, as for all RAF involvement in the empire. The major justification for giving the RAF Iraq (apart from the fact it justified the continued existence of the RAF as an independent entity) was the supposed economy offered by Air Control over the cost of conventional garrisons, although not even Churchill believed the RAF line that Air Control could totally replace the latter. Considering Lund's comments on how declared RAF doctrine (ie bombing) applied in the Battle of France: the answer is simple - it didn't, at least in a direct sense. Again, the RAF view on this is clear from one of its own, Chief of Air Staff Sir Cyril Newall. In 1937, Newall opined that close-support for ground operations was "a gross misuse of air power". It is also significant that he and his successors fought hard against deploying the BEF on the Continent, and then to limit its size when that failed. This was purely because they wished to keep the RAF contribution to the AASF as small as possible in order to prevent it impinging upon what the bomber lobby considered to be its real task - launching a knock-out blow against the German homeland. Lund's comment on the Phoney War prohibition against the RAF penetrating into Germany is fair enough, apart from the fact that the RAF was arguably incapable of doing so had it been allowed. RAF casualties in daylight bombing of coastal German targets in 1939 were little short of catastrophic - thereby disproving the RAF claim that the bomber would always get through - and the RAF was neither trained nor equipped for night bombing, as was rapidly realised when they tried to bomb Hornum on 19 March 1940. The Cabinet ban was thus fortuitous to say the least. With ref to the RAF launching attacks against German LoC and troop concentrations, I have never suggested that this was not the case - after all, that was the task of the AASF. There is also the fact that not everyone in the RAF was a strategic bomber zealot. However, the fact remains that this was very much an adjunct to the real business of delivering knock-out blows. This is apparent by the fact that the Blenheim squadrons were handed to the AASF on 10 May. The Blenheim was unsuitable for strategic bombing because of its limited range and speed, and Bomber Command was thus making no great sacrifice in sending them to France for close support work. Note, however, that no Whitleys, Hampdens or Wellingtons were despatched to the AASF. And in any case, the rate at which the AASF's Battle aircraft were lost necessitated some rapid replacement... Lund states that it is unclear why Bomber Command began trying to hit industrial targets east of the Rhine in mid-May. I would suggest the reason was very clear - Bomber Command was attempting to implement the knock-out blow it ahd been cherishing for the twenty years since the Independent Force was disbanded. The figures for Bomber command sorties also beg comment. It is logical to assume that the bulk of the 1170 close support missions were flown by the Blenheims, which were fit for little else. I would be interested to see more detail on the 807 LoC missions, in order to see which aircraft were involved, and precisely how LoC was defined. In addition, I would argue the important point is not that less strategic missions were flown than the other two categories, but that any strategic missions were thought appropriate at all, given the timescale and battlefield situation. This, I would also contend, speaks volumes about where the RAF's preferences lay. I look forward to Lund's response, and also to the future discussion on RAF procurement and capability. all the best Bill Buckingham PhD candidate, University of Glasgow
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