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I continue to argue that the distinction between tactical and strategic air power is artificial from the perspective of the RAF, and that the belief that it, and by extension the concept of air independence, is founded on the supposed primacy of counterasset ["strategic"] bombing is mistaken. As I have said, that position conflates the RAF's own frequently stated mission and doctrine with that of its critics. I want to say a little more about operations during the Battle of France, but any argument from operations to a presumptive doctrine, especially a gnostic doctrine that contradicts the RAF's official line is induction, thus logically problematic. Jill Russell states that "The evolution of the U.S. Air Force very much had to do with finding it a self-contained mission so as to validate its separate branch standing." I agree. But that was not the case for the RAF. It was specifically formed, according to the recommendations of the Smuts Report, to assume the obligation of metropolitan defence. It therefore answered a well-established institutional dispute between the Royal Garrison Artillery and the Royal Navy as to which was responsible for the defence of GReat Britain (and dependencies) from raiders. This solution to a chronic problem of divided responsibilities would be in itself a strong justification for the existence of the RAF, even if no such thing as aircraft existed. Of course, the RAF also consolidated training, R&D, and other infrastructural requirements. Just as each of the elder services had assumed responsibility for control of industrial procurement in certain sectors for all needs, so the RAF now assumed control of aircraft and internal combustion engine procurement for the Army and RN as well. The implication, soon realised, was that the RAF would operate a small naval and ground force, while the navy, and the army would in the future be permitted to operate aircraft. Honestly! Admittedly there were efforts in the RAF to go back on this arrangement in the 30s, but they were not successful. John Pritchard points out that "air policing" is a mission extrinsic to metropolitan defence. I agree, and admit that I was generalising somewhat. The RAF's responsibilities extended to providing a similar protection to dependencies. However, that could not be all. The RN and the army had agreed to let their air arms lapse out of concern for economy (officially, and unofficially, to "give the RAF a chance.") But obviously overseas service garrisons would henceforth expect air support. Many even argued that garrison duties would be cheaper with air support. (A position I believe to be the key to British strategy generally in the interwar period.) In the past, as well as providing the fighting forces, the Army, RN, and Indian Army had shared an additional burden, that of the military administration of the dependencies. It was now suggested that if these costs were to come from army and RN estimate, the RAF, too, must make some sacrifice from its funding by assuming some military administrative duties. Iraq, an area where a particularly good claim could be made for the usefulness of air support, and in any case lying right across the proposed Imperial air route to India and Australia, was chosen. RAF administrative control of Iraq is _not_ the same thing as air policing, something that went on everywhere, just as army operations continued in Iraq. And while Hankey and Vansittart thought the Air Staff was a bunch of idiots that didn't stop them from supporting air rearmament on a large scale. And in their defence, I might add that the Air Staff weren't dolts, they were engineers :-) Bill Buckingham suggests that the RAF was created to carry out strategic bombing in the sense of counterasset operations, and this means that it ought to have vanished in 1918. I reiterate, metropolitan air defence implied counterforce operations, as indeed did army and naval cooperation. Bombardments of ports, dockyards, and LOC targets were basic to received strategy long before Kitty Hawk. How was RAF declared doctrine applied in the Battle of France? 1) Pursuant to the official manual (War Office, _Employment of Air Forces In Cooperation with Armies in the Field_ [London: HMSO, 1935{?}](title?) and reiterated in Slessor's 1935 _Air Power and Armies_, an air component was attached to the BEF from Army Cooperation in the field consisting of army cooperation aircraft and fighters for tactical reconnaissance, liason, and "low flying attack," or close air support. 2) In conformance likewise, an independent air force, the 14 squadron Advanced Air Striking Force was attached to the BEF. As in Flanders in 1917, its independence was reserved to permit it to operate in support of commands other than the BEF, but its duties thereto were fully spelled out and in no way avoided. 2) However, the Cabinet forbade the AASF or Bomber Command from operating in the interior of Germany except for reconnaissance, thus the phony war. 3) On 10 May, 1940, the Germans attacked in the West. Immediately, 10 Blenheim squadrons of 2 Broup (checked these details in Middlebrook, _Bomber Command War Diaries_ was attached to the AASF. Although AASF records have been lost, through 3/06/40, 2 Group alone conducted over 900 daylight sorties, exclusively attacks on the line of communications or low flying attacks against GErman troop concentrations, beginning with attacks on the German air and bridgeheads on 10-11 May, 1940. 4) Heavy bomber squadrons of Bomber Command remained under control of that headquarters, but that does not mean that they ignored the battle. From 10-15 May they conducted 145 sorties against road, rail, and airhead targets in the Benelux countries and Germany west of the Rhine. 5) On the night of 15-16 May Bomber Command began to attack industrial targets east of the Rhine. It is not clear why they did this, but the Official History states that German attacks on London in 1917 had serious consequences on offensive operations in Flanders by forcing the diversion of fighting aircraft to defensive duties. Attacks on industrial targets continued until 20 May, when the onset of the May full moon period made tactical operations by night bombers feasible. Largely in these 5 days, Bomber Command conducted 658 strategic sorties. 6) In the course of the new moon period and beyond, heavy bombers of Bomber Command conducted 807 sorties against LOC targets, and 214 sorties against tactical targets. the latter, largely Wellington missions against GErman troop concentrations around Dunkirk, are not clearly distinguished as between low flying attacks and tactical bombings. IN summary, aircraft of metropolitan Bomber Command flew 1170 close air support missions, 807 missions against LOC, and 658 strategic missions. Residual but underdocumented missions by the Air Component, AASF, and British based a/c of other Commands and the Fleet Air Arm would further bias the total in favour of tactical operations. Of course, at this time there was little German air activity over Great Britain. As my particular interest lies in the relationship between technology, procurement, and strategy, I will leave to some later date a discussion of my views of RAF aircraft procurement and capability, particularly in regards Stanley Sandler's posting. Erik Lund PS: If Eric Bergerud is still reading, I signed out your new book today, and will certainly buy a copy as soon as I win the lottery!
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