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The interesting part of this is whether it provides an alte Folks: The interesting part of this is whether it provides an alternative to impeachment and trial as the only way to remove a judge. How would a judge be convicted of receiving a bribe under the statute? Note that bribery was already an impeachable offense, but it was not clear whether receiving the bribe was included (I would guess it was). Then what is the relation between the constitutional provision (of 1787) and the statutory language (of 1790). If I understand the rule for this, the later language modifies the former language, thus receiving a bribe would be grounds for removal and disqualification for life, whereas before the statute, bribery would be grounds for removal and, possibly, disqualification (but for how long?). A related point. I recall Akhil Amar arguing before a joint congressional committee that impeachment and conviction at trial should not be the only way to remove a sitting judge. Does the statute of 1790 support that contention? (I.e. would the bribery conviction of a sitting judge at trial in a court of law suffice to remove him or her?) We've had a number of cases of that kind already--Nixon, Hastings, etc. In the Hastings case, conviction (in both federal court and the Senate) did not bar him from gaining an office (in Congress), or are elective offices not included in the statute? Peter Charles Hoffer Distinguished Research Professor Department of History University of Georgia Athens, GA 30602
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