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I thank the members of H-Diplo for their responses to my question about the decision to recognize the state of Israel in 1948. In response to Professor Klinghoffer's request for information about Secretary of State Marshall's opposition to recognition, one can look to the records of the meeting on 12 May 1948 in the Oval Office. Clark Clifford presented a compelling case for recognition. Marshall responded by indicating that if recognition occurred, then he (Marshall) would not vote for Truman in the next election (this to Truman's face). Marshall's opposition seems to have been based on his appreciation for the growing significance of oil in the region, not merely for the United States (ARAMCO had been created the previous year), but also for American allies. His view, clearly shared by the British, was that recognition of the state of Israel would compromise those concrete interests. In political science, the conflict seems to have been between ideals and interests, and in this case, ideals seem to have won out. This outcome is not in and of itself unusual, but, given Truman's very high regard for Marshall, it is an outcome that needs to be explained in greater detail. I hasten to add that I do not believe that this outcome is only explained using the Mearsheimer/Walt framework--indeed, in my own mind, the moral case for recognition was sufficient. But whenever a state compromises very real, tangible interests, the decision must be examined carefully. Vincent Ferraro Ruth Lawson Professor of International Politics Mount Holyoke College South Hadley, MA