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I'm not sure why Prof. MacNichol's recent message quibbles with my description of US specialized military forces and advisors (often in fact commanders) as "props" to ARVN. Obviously, it's a little pointless to imply that someone was or was not "playing fair." What I am saying is that the prospects for the continued viability of ARVN was degraded by the subtraction of some of the new weaponry (the birth of the "smart weapon" took place largely in 1972 during the PAVN offensive) and the American officers that played such a crucial role in stiffening resolve during the 1972 firestorm. Both factors, especially the withdrawal of the advisors, materially had an impact on the balance of forces on the ground. The GVN was going to have a rough road no matter how things had developed during the early '70's. However, the decision of Nixon/Kissinger to accept a peace without demanding PAVN's withdrawal made a difficult situation almost an impossible one. Eric Bergerud
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